Edited by Sidney McAlear

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The United States operates roughly 19 military sites across the Middle East, eight of which are considered permanent. Tens of thousands of personnel. Billions in infrastructure. The “crown jewel” is Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar which hosts CENTCOM's forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), 10,000+ troops, two runways over 12,000 feet, and an $8 billion investment by Qatar since 2003 specifically to attract and keep US forces there.

These bases were the foundation of our regional strategy. Deterrence through presence. The idea being: if you can see us, you know not to mess with us.

Iran disagreed.

What got hit.

Since the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026, Iranian strikes have touched nearly every major US facility in the region:

Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia — Five KC-135 tankers were damaged on the flight line in a single missile strike reported on March 16. One US soldier, Sgt. Benjamin Pennington, 26, was killed in a previous strike on March 1st. The tanker fleet is the campaign's oxygen supply…and rather limited considering the demand.
Al Dhafra Air Base, UAE — Iranian drones targeted the base. This happened hours after Iran's president publicly apologized to Gulf states for IRGC attacks. The apology and the strike were delivered on the same day.
Naval Support Activity Bahrain, 5th Fleet HQ — Missile and drone strikes reported. A Shahed drone hit a tower block near the headquarters. Fires visible. Damage confirmed.
Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar — Two Iranian missiles intercepted over Qatari territory. The AN/FPS-132 early warning radar at the base was destroyed. That radar took years to build and will take years to replace.

Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait. Muwaffaq Al Salti, Jordan. Ain Al Asad, Iraq. Duqm Port, Oman.

Every major hub. Hit or targeted.

The bases didn't deter Iran. In several cases, they made our partners bigger targets.

We've been here before.

In 1991, after the Gulf War, the US established a major presence at Prince Sultan Air Base to enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq. At its peak: 5,000 personnel, 200+ coalition aircraft.

By 1996, Khobar Towers had been bombed. Nineteen Americans killed. The US presence near Mecca and Medina became Osama bin Laden's central recruiting argument — and fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals.

On April 29, 2003, with Saddam fallen, Donald Rumsfeld and Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan announced a “mutual agreement” to withdraw. The framing was strategic. The reality was that Saudi authorities had been quietly uncomfortable for years. They tried to suppress news that Americans were running the Iraq air war from Saudi soil. The political cost had become unsustainable.

The US left. Quietly. By August 2003, the last USAF unit had deactivated.

Sidebar: During my last deployment in 2014/15, we had two jets divert into a Saudi Airfield, which instantly activated high-level State Department involvement. Two jets diverted around 11pm local time. About 13 hours later the jets returned. In that short time span, a C-130 had been called into our base, loaded with parts and maintenance personnel, flown to the divert base, and repaired two aircraft…rather impressive.

But in 2019, we came back. Prince Sultan was reactivated around 2019 as Iran tensions rose again. The logic was the same as before: deterrence through presence….or “peace through strength,” as that seems to be the current message.

Iran just hit it with ballistic missiles and damaged five tankers on the flight line.

History isn't repeating itself exactly. But it's ringing loud enough to hear from here.

My take: The broken guarantee.

The deal was simple. Gulf states host US forces, accept the political risk that comes with it, and in exchange, they get a security umbrella. Deterrence. Protection.

That deal is under serious strain right now.

The Soufan Center put it plainly: "Gulf officials will reassess the utility of American military bases on their territory, which have neither acted as a deterrent nor protected these states."

Iran's foreign ministry told CNBC that US military assets in neighboring countries are "legitimate targets under international law." The message to Gulf rulers isn't subtle: hosting Americans makes you a target.

And then they proved it. Repeatedly.

Monarchies, not democracies.

There is no election coming. No vote of no confidence. Public opinion doesn't force a Gulf king's hand the way it might a European prime minister.

Pressure in monarchies runs through different channels. And those channels are moving.

Economic pressure — Dubai International Airport lost an estimated $600 million per day in tourism revenue during the height of the strikes. Amazon data centers in the UAE were targeted by Iranian drones. Insurance premiums for regional operations jumped 300 to 1,000 percent. Forty thousand flights canceled. You cannot be the world's connectivity hub and an active war zone at the same time. That's not a military problem for Gulf rulers — it's an existential economic one.

Elite backlash — These aren't anonymous protesters. Prince Turki al-Faisal publicly called this "Netanyahu's war." Khalaf Al Habtoor, one of Dubai's most prominent businessmen, questioned the US publicly. The Gulf Research Center chairman described the economic toll as "enormous." In a monarchy, when the establishment voices start talking like that, rulers listen.

The Bahrain variable — The US 5th Fleet is headquartered there. Bahrain also has a Shia majority that has been repressed for years. Carnegie is reporting protests breaking out. If that instability grows, the most sensitive US naval facility in the region sits directly in the middle of it.

Strategic hedging — Gulf officials are already quietly reviewing force majeure clauses in existing agreements. Security alliances are being diversified. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others reportedly warned the Trump administration in January about the risks of military action.

The question nobody wants to answer.

The kingdoms won't kick the US out tomorrow. The relationships are too deep, the economics too intertwined, the security dependencies too real — on both sides.

But the longer this war runs, the harder the math gets. The bases didn't deter Iran. They didn't protect Gulf infrastructure. They made Gulf capitals targets. And the Gulf states are footing a significant part of the bill — in Patriot interceptors alone, they fired roughly twice what US forces did in the opening days.

The 2003 withdrawal happened because the threat was removed and both sides had a convenient offramp. Saddam was gone. The awkward roommate situation could end gracefully.

This time, the threat isn't going anywhere. And the offramp isn't obvious.

How this ultimately resolves — whether US basing in the Gulf looks the same in five years as it does today — is one of the most important strategic questions of this conflict. It's just not the one getting covered.

In History

On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb detonated outside Khobar Towers at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen US airmen were killed. 498 wounded. The investigation pointed toward Iranian-backed Hezbollah. The US stayed. Seven years later, quietly and without fanfare, they left. The presence that was supposed to project strength had become the liability it was trying to prevent. Some lessons take a while to land.